

From: Tokyo (Togo)
 To: Honolulu
 December 6, 1941
 PA-KM
 #125

Please wire immediately on the latter part of my #123' the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

ARMY 7381 20438 Secret Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

* Not available.

(Japanese)

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
 #907. To be handled in government code.
 Re my #902'.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (8)

* J10-1: 7145—text of Japanese reply.

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Extremely Urgent)
 #910.

After deciphering part 14 of my #900' and also #907', #908' and #909', please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

* R.I.S. #15541—text of reply.

* R.I.S. # 25850.

* R.I.S. # 25843.

* R.I.S. # 25848.

25854 Trans. 12/7/41 (8)

From: Budapest.
 To: Tokyo
 December 7, 1941
 LA
 #101

Re my #100'.

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communiqué to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

* Refered to Berlin.

ARMY 25805 7181 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT No. 8

Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, Jagd, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board

The following documents comprise intercepts obtained from British sources.

They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to 22 December 1941.

MOST SECRET.

To be kept under lock and key: never to be removed from the office.

Japanese Consul, Singapore, Requests Issue of Code Words.

No: 097975

Date: 21st November, 1941.

From: Japanese Consul-General, SINGAPORE.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 717.

Date: 17th November, 1941.

Immediate:

Some day the British authorities will prohibit the use of cypher telegrams by this office. To prepare for this eventuality please draw up secret code words and send them by Consul-General OKAMOTO as diplomatic correspondence. Please include in this secret code, words necessary for military intelligence, evacuation of residents, the closing down of this office etc. Please see the Naval Secret Code which I have received recently.

Director. F. O. (3). F. I. D. Admiralty. Colonial Office. M. I. 5.

Japanese Code Phrases for Broadcasting in Event of Emergency

No. 098127

Date: 25th November, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister. TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Chargé. LONDON.

No: 2363 Circular.

Date: 19th November, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

The international situation is tense and we cannot tell when the worst may happen. In such an event, communications between the Empire and the enemy countries will immediately cease. Therefore when our diplomatic relations are on the point of being severed, we shall broadcast, as the weather report, the following phrases in the middle and at the end of the news in Japanese in our overseas broadcast service:

(1) If Japanese-American relations are in question: "Higashi no kaze ame" (Easterly wind, rain).

(2) If JAPAN and the SOVIET are concerned: 'Kita no kaze kumori' (Northerly wind, cloudy).

(3) In the case of JAPAN and BRITAIN (including the invasion of THAILAND or an attack on MALAYA): "Nishi no kaze hare" (Westerly wind, fine).

The appropriate phrase will each time be broadcast twice in a resolute voice and you should accordingly [group corrupt: destroy by fire] codes documents, etc.

The above is to be treated as strictly confidential.

From: The Japanese Chargé, LONDON.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 700 Urgent of 21st November, 1941.

Reference your circular telegram No. 2353. (above).

Director. F. O. (3). F. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5

Sir E. BRIDGES,
Dominions Office.

Japanese Foreign Office View of Conversations With America

No: 998151

Date: 25th NOVEMBER, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Diplomatic Representatives, ANGORA, &c

No: 2364 Circular.

Date: 20th November, 1941.

Confidential.

1. Since the formation of the new Cabinet the Government has started a conference in daily contact with Imperial Headquarters and has been able to debate a fundamental national policy to cope with the pressing situation of the day. At the morning session on the 5th instant, a decision was taken on the policy to be adopted for adjusting Japanese-American diplomatic relations.

2. The Japanese-American negotiations are to be pursued by considering the adjustment of diplomatic relations on an equitable basis. These have been in progress since the 7th, but there is a considerable difference of opinion between the two parties, and in view of the progress made so far there is some doubt as to whether a compromise will be reached. For our part, we are doing our utmost to reach a compromise, but we cannot make any further concessions, and the outlook is not bright. Should the negotiations break down, that part of the situation in which the Japanese Empire is involved will be critical.

The foregoing is for your exclusive information.

This telegram is addressed to BERNE, ANGORA and VLADIVOSTOK.

BERNE will repeat to VICHY, MADRID, LISBON, STOCKHOLM, HELSINGFORS and PRETORIA.

ANGORA will repeat to BUCHAREST, SOFIA and BUDAPEST.

Togo.

Director (3) P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges.

At this post there is nothing for it but to use the Navy's wireless. Details have been telegraphed by the Naval Attaché to the Admiralty. Please refer to them and make the necessary arrangements.

Japanese Broadcasts: Reception in Rome.

No: 098232

Date: 27th NOVEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 740.

Date: 20th November, 1941.

In regard to the general news broadcasts, not only JUO but JAP (which was changed on the 20th) were generally impossible to receive. This was due to unstable weather conditions at this time of year which made the note weak, in addition to which there was much interference from miscellaneous noises.

In view of the recent international situation the demand for [group corrupt: ? news ? information] is steadily increasing. We foresee no difficulty about reception arrangements at this end but in present weather conditions good reception will not be possible on one wavelength only. It is essential that simultaneous broadcasts be sent on two or three wavelengths. I understand that the recently changed DOMEI broadcasts in English have begun simultaneous broadcasts, and I ask that every effort be made for these simultaneous broadcasts to be carried out.

For your information I will, till further notice, telegraph reception efficiency every three days.

HORIKIRI.

Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. M. I. 5.

Japanese Cypher Machines: Security Measures.

No: 098313

Date: 29th November, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: BERNE, WASHINGTON, etc.

No: 2398 (Circular telegram).

Date: 25th November, 1941.

Most Secret:

Recently our cypher machines (the printing portion of "A" and the shift key of "B") have been designated as a State Secret. Any leakage of information connected therewith will incur the application of the National Defence Peace Preservation Law. As regards the machine in your keeping, you are strictly enjoined to take every precaution for safe and secret custody.

On the right-hand side of the number plate affixed to the printing portion and shift key, please write the words "Kokka Kimitsu" [State Secret] in red enamel.

This telegram is to be relayed, as the Foreign Minister's instructions, in the following manner:

From WASHINGTON to MEXICO, RIO DE JANEIRO and BUENOS AIRES.

By cable.

BERNE to LONDON, VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and ANGORA. By cable.

VICHY to MADRID. By safe hand.

HANOI to SAIGON. By safe hand.

Director. F.O. (3). M.I.5.

Japanese Ambassador, Hanoi, Asks for Instruction in Event of Emergency

No: 098400.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

From: Japanese [? Ambassador], HANOI.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 118.

Date: 26th November, 1941.

[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

(Secret.)

To judge from what I hear from the Military, the American answer reached us [? on the 24th]. If this is so the Cabinet Council will no doubt finally reach a decision in a day or two and determine whether it is to be peace or war. If Japanese-American negotiations are to be held we shall of course take in hand progressively the various undertakings previously planned; but if the negotiations break down, as preparations for military operations are nearing completion, an advance would be possible within ten days or so. In that event considerable modifications would be necessary in the programme of undertakings to be carried out under our present policy, and it will be necessary to initiate measures and negotiations in keeping with our military operations. What causes me most concern and [? anxiety] is whether, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, it is the policy of the Government and Imperial Headquarters to carry on military operations leaving the status of the Government of INDO-CHINA as it is at present, and on this point I require to be informed in advance; and not only so but I want to make necessary preparations with all speed. If, therefore, you have any views on the development of the Japanese-American negotiations and the prospects alluded to I beg that you will telegraph them at once. Moreover, while it goes without saying that secrecy must be preserved, nevertheless, according to newspaper reports, AMERICA has been consulting with BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, the NETHERLANDS and the Chinese in WASHINGTON, and these Governments are aware of the purport of the Japanese-American negotiations. And what is more, the Military here, as the result of comings and goings between here and TOKYO, are aware of the nature of your instructions and of the ins and outs of the negotiations: in fact I have the impression that the only people who are left in the dark are Foreign Office officials. Seeing that the situation is as tense as is indicated in your circular telegram No. 2383 [our No. 098127], should be glad to receive your instructions on these points as soon as possible, either by telegram, messenger or some other method.

Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.O. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.B. Major Morton. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

To: Japanese [? Ambassador], HANOI.

No: 93 of 26th November, 1941.

(Also in Chef de Mission cypher recyphered).

Reference your No. 118 (above).

My circular telegram *No. 2414 gives the course of the Japanese-American negotiations and my circular telegram *No. 2416 tells of their present continuation. Even in the event of the worst happening the Imperial Government has not taken any special decision to make a change in the status of the Government of INDO-CHINA. You may therefore take it that for the present our policy is to maintain the status quo. Please do your best on this understanding.

Repeated to Paris and Berlin.

Togo.

[Dept. Note *Not yet decyphered].

Japan and the Axis: Plans in Event of Breakdown of Washington Conversations

No: 098413.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassadors, BERLIN and ROME.

No: 2387 Circular.

Date: 24th November, 1941.

[Very corrupt text. In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

For your own information only.

The Japanese-American negotiations [?] are [seem to be] approaching their final stage . . . [two lines corrupt]. In the event of the breakdown of the negotiations we shall be face to face with a rupture of relations with BRITAIN and AMERICA, and the necessity is likely to arise for the sudden tightening up of the relations which have hitherto prevailed for cooperation between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY. My idea is that [? you] should then propose [two groups] action to be taken; but [two groups] I shall ask Your Excellency to be active during this month. It is possible that circumstances may necessitate your having a special interview with Führer HITLER (Premier MUSSOLINI), so please bear this in mind. [Two groups] until you approach them you should refrain absolutely from saying anything to the Germans (Italians). This for your information and in haste.

At the moment the time is not ripe for a detailed report on the Japanese-American negotiations. Please note, however, that we have taken every precaution to obviate any obstacle to the maintenance of the Three Power Pact.

This telegram is addressed to BERLIN and ROME.

Togo.

Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese Communications by Naval Wireless in Event of Emergency

No: 098414.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

From: Japanese Chargé, London.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

No: 778.

Date: 29th November, 1941.

In present circumstances it may happen that the despatch and delivery of telegrams may be purposely delayed or completely held up and that we shall not be able to depend on the reliability of communications. I therefore request you to take steps to [? make simultaneous use of] the Naval wireless, as in my No. 760 [our No. 098127].

[Dept: Note: Cyphered in "X" and recyphered on the machine].

Director. F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese Plans: Instructions to Ambassador at Berlin

BJ/35.

No: 098452.

Date: 2nd December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

No: 935 Very urgent.

Date: 30th November, 1941.

[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

Reference my circular telegram No. 2387. [Our No. 098413].

1. The Japanese-American negotiations begun in April of this year under the former Cabinet have now reached a stage at which a breakdown is inevitable, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government. The Empire, faced with this situation, has to take the most serious decisions. You should therefore see **Führer HITLER** and Foreign Minister **RIBBENTROP** at once and give them an outline of developments in confidence. At the same time you should tell them in confidence that the attitude of **BRITAIN** and **AMERICA** has recently been provocative and they have continued to move troops into all parts of Eastern ASIA. To meet this we too have been compelled to move troops, and it is greatly to be feared that an armed collision will occur and we shall find ourselves in a state of war with **BRITAIN** and **AMERICA**. You should add that this may happen sooner than is expected.

[Here Part II is missing. It will be sent in later if received].

4. If when you make this communication questions are asked by the Germans and Italians as to our attitude towards **RUSSIA**, you should tell them that our attitude towards the **SOVIET** is as explained to them on 2nd July of this year, that we will of course not relax our restraint on the **SOVIET** as the result of our action in the south; but that if the **SOVIET**, acting in cooperation with **BRITAIN** and **AMERICA**, take hostile action against us, we are prepared to resist it resolutely; that it is on the South, however, that we lay most emphasis, and that we propose to refrain from deliberately taking positive action in the North.

5. As all this concerns our plan of campaign it of course requires the utmost secrecy, and you should make a special point of impressing this strongly on the Germans and Italians.

6. With regard to telling the Italians, immediately after our Ambassador in **BERLIN** has told the Germans, Premier **MUSSOLINI** and Foreign Minister **CIANO** should be informed. As soon as the dates for the German and Italian interviews are fixed please telegraph.

Please repeat to Rome as my instructions.

Togo.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese orders for destruction of cypher machine in London Embassy

Date: 3rd December, 1941.
No 698509.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, LONDON.

No: [? 2443] Circular.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

Secret and Urgent.

Please take steps for the immediate disuse of the cypher machine at your Embassy.

With regard to the steps to be taken, these should conform to the instructions sent previously. Please exercise the greatest care and, in particular, with regard to the methods of dismantling and breaking up the essential parts, carry them out strictly in accordance with instructions.

On receipt of this, please telegraph immediately the one word "**SETSUJU**"* (Received) en clair, and, having carried out these instructions, telegraph the word "**HASSŌ**"* (Despatched), also en clair.

With regard to the cypher connected with the machine, you are, of course, also to burn your copy No. 26 of the YU code (machine code) (the settings for use on the machine for communication between this Department and the Embassy in LONDON).

(Dept. Note: *These messages received, dated 2nd December, 1941.)

Director (3). F. C. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion Office.

Japanese-Thai Relations: Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Care Thai Minister

No: 698525.

Date: 4th December, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 1347.

Date: 20th November, 1941.

I received a visit from the Thai Minister on the 20th. He opened his remarks by saying that he also was a soldier and would like to have a frank talk with me as between men who had known each other for many years. He then referred to a recent crop of rumours to the effect that JAPAN was to invade THAILAND, and to reports of large Japanese troop concentrations on the Thai frontier of French INDO-CHINA, and asked point blank whether there was any truth in them or not. I replied that I had had no news from my home Government on these matters but that my own belief was that JAPAN's actions toward all Far Eastern races were aimed at applying the principle of live-and-let-live, the fact being that in cases such as that of the recent arbitration between THAILAND and French INDO-CHINA JAPAN had done her utmost for THAILAND for this very reason and would never invade THAILAND for the purpose of aggression. But the facts were that GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA had set up the so-called ABCD front in opposition to JAPAN's establishment of a New Order, finally threatening the existence even of JAPAN herself. JAPAN of course would be compelled to continue her course brushing this aside, and that she wished to attain this and by peaceful means was obvious from the mere fact of her having sent Mr. KURUSU to AMERICA. However if the worst came to the worst and it was unavoidable, JAPAN would have to take the necessary steps for her own existence—not that there would be any question of this happening if THAILAND soon understood JAPAN's ultimate purpose and displayed an attitude of cooperation with JAPAN; she would have to invade THAILAND only if that country should blindly follow the lead of GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA and take up an attitude of opposition.

The Minister interposed by describing the position in which THAILAND was placed and by stating emphatically that THAILAND would never oppose JAPAN as an Anglo-American cat's-paw.

When suggesting his visit the Minister said that he wished to see me urgently, and OMMINISI's view that he probably came on instructions from his home Government.

The Germans are also extremely interested in Thai problems and I should be glad if you would inform me at once as to the latest situation.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese Chargé, London, Submits Plans for Withdrawal of Embassy etc. Staffs

Date: 4th December, 1941.

No: 098539.

From: The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, LONDON.

T: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 781.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

It is feared that in the event of the situation becoming critical the exchange of telegrams may become impossible. I therefore submit the following points for your consideration and request instructions.

1. In view of conditions at this post, countries suitable for protecting our interests after the withdrawal of this Embassy are BRAZIL or SWITZERLAND. I suggest that the matter be discussed in TOKYO with the country concerned, so that instructions may be sent by that Government to its Ambassador (Minister) in LONDON.

2. Is there any objection to burning the consular exequaturs at present held in custody, viz: LIVERPOOL, DUBLIN, RANGOON, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, BATAVIA, MACASSAR and VANCOUVER?

3. The stipulations for withdrawal of the Embassy etc. staffs and of resident Japanese should be made with the British on a strictly reciprocal basis. If this could be done it would be necessary to effect the exchange at a stipulated place, each side providing a ship. An agreement would have to be drawn up regarding the dates of departure etc. to prevent anything going amiss.

(In the case of GERMANY the exchange took place in HOLLAND, in ITALY's case it was at LISBON. If hostages are taken there is the danger that our nationals will not be able to leave the country). The evacuees to be exchanged are:

1st party: Embassy and Consular staff

2nd party: Newspaper correspondents

3rd party: Japanese Staff of banks and companies

who were sent out from JAPAN (the 2nd and 3rd parties are not necessarily in order of precedence). Exchange for each party will be arranged separately. As a principle I do not wish to include employees locally engaged and Japanese residing here of their own wish. Concerning the above negotiations should be undertaken both here and in TOKYO and, if necessary, instructions can be given via the countries who will protect our interests.

In round figures the number of persons is:

(a) Officials—34 (including the Chargé d'Affaires, secretaries, military and naval attachés, advisory consuls, telegraphic attachés, chancellors, special employees and their families).

(b) Newspaper correspondents—6.

(c) Bank and Company employees—30.

Director (3). F. O. (13). F. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Sir R. Hopkins. M. E. W. (2). Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office

Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc. in Washington Embassy

Date: 4th December, 1941.

No: 098540.

BJ/87

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, WASHINGTON.

No: 867 Secret.

Date: 2nd December, 1941.

[Dept: Note: Compare our No. 098509].

Of the telegraphic cyphers with which your Embassy is provided you are to burn all (including the cyphers of other Ministers in your charge) except one copy each of the machine cypher now in use, cypher "O" and cypher "L".

2. You are also to discard* one complete cyphre machine.

3. As soon as this is done you should telegraph the one word "HARUNO".

4. You should deal with files of in and out telegrams and other secret documents in an appropriate and suitable manner at your discretion.

5. The syphers brought by Cypher Officer KOSAKA [? should all be burnt]. (Consequently the need to get in touch with MEXICO referred to in my telegram No. 860 [not received] [last word corrupt]).

[Dept: Note: *The worde used, "haiki", can mean "cease to use", "abolish", "discard". It is not the normal word for "destroy"].

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. War Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Reports Ribbentrop's Statement on German War Plans

No: 098541

Date: 4th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 1393.

Date: 29th November, 1941.

(Chef de Mission Cypher).

I was to have had an evening meeting yesterday, the 28th, with RIBBENTROP at his request, but he suddenly asked me to postpone it, and it was ten at night before we met.

The reason for the postponement was that GOERING and leading Government and Forces personalities met at the Fuehrer's official residence and held an important conference lasting for many hours. Now that the objects of the Russian campaign have for the most part been achieved, and the results of interviews with the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the European countries collated, they discussed the direction and policy of next year's campaign, and I have no doubt that at this conference JAPAN's action was also discussed.

1. First of all RIBBENTROP again asked if I had received any news about the Japanese-American negotiations. I replied that I had not yet received any official news. RIBBENTROP said JAPAN must not lose this opportunity of achieving the establishment of the New Order in East ASIA, and never had there been a time when close cooperation between the three Allies was more imperative. If JAPAN hesitated and GERMANY carried through the New Order in EUROPE alone, BRITAIN and AMERICA would turn the brunt of their attack against JAPAN. He insisted that, as the Fuehrer had said that day, the existence of JAPAN and GERMANY on the one hand and of AMERICA on the other was fundamentally incompatible, and the Germans were in receipt of reports that, owing to the stiff attitude of the Americans, there was practically no possibility of the Japanese-American negotiations being successful. If this was so, and if JAPAN determined on war against BRITAIN and AMERICA, not only would this be to the common advantage of JAPAN and GERMANY, but he believed it would be to JAPAN's advantage also.

I said I know nothing of JAPAN'S plans and therefore could not answer; but I asked whether His Excellency really thought a state of war would arise between GERMANY and AMERICA. He replied that ROOSEVELT was diseased, and there was no knowing what he would do.

Considering that hitherto RIBBENTROP has always answered that AMERICA would avoid war, and in view of recent speeches by HITLER and RIBBENTROP, it seems to me that GERMANY's attitude towards AMERICA is gradually stiffening, and that she has reached the stage where she would not shun even war with AMERICA.

2. I enquired about the future of the war against RUSSIA. RIBBENTROP replied that the Fuehrer had said that it was now his inflexible determination to sweep away and crush the SOVIET once and for all. The most important military operations had been concluded, and a large part of the army would be withdrawn to GERMANY. They would, however, continue operations in the CAUCASUS, and next Spring with a part of it they would make an attack on and beyond the URALS and chase STALIN into SIBERIA. I asked when approximately this was to be, and he said it was intended that the attack should start in about May of next year.

I next observed that I gathered from what he said that they were quite determined on attacking the SOVIET, and the thing I should like done as soon as possible was the creation of air communications between MANCHURIA and GERMANY. He replied that the Germans had been thinking of this for some time past, and he thought that next Summer it would not be impossible to fly in one hop from somewhere near the URALS to MANCHURIA.

3. I asked about plans for an attack on BRITAIN. He said that before the landing in BRITAIN they would chase British influence clean out of the NEAR EAST, AFRICA, GIBALTAR and the MEDITERRANEAN. I gather from this statement by RIBBENTROP that they attach even more importance than before to this area. I asked if they intended to carry on without, attacking the BRITISH ISLES. RIBBENTROP said that GERMANY was of course making preparations for this; but according to reports reaching GERMANY the internal situation in BRITAIN was not any too good. For instance the split in the Conservative Party, the lack of confidence in CHURCHILL and the revolutionary ideas of BEVIN, the Labour leader, were making internal conditions quite difficult. There were of course some people who did not believe this; but the Fuehrer believed that conditions in BRITAIN were bad and thought that as the result of GERMANY's future operations, even, it might be, without an invasion, BRITAIN would be beaten.

In any case, however, GERMANY for her part had no intention whatever of making peace with ENGLAND, and the plan was to drive British influence out of EUROPE entirely. After the War, therefore, BRITAIN would be left absolutely powerless, and although the BRITISH ISLES would remain, all other British territory would be split up into three under GERMANY, AMERICA and JAPAN. In AFRICA, GERMANY would, generally speaking, be satisfied with

her old colonies and would give a great part to ITALY. It was, he said, to obtaining (group corrupt) that GERMANY attached the most importance.

4. Remarking in conclusion that the very satisfactory progress of the War under German leadership was fully recognised and that GERMANY naturally had to extend the area of operations by regarding as enemies not only BRITAIN but also countries under British influence and those helping BRITAIN, I asked him when he thought the War would end. To this he replied that, although he hoped it would be brought to a conclusion in the course of next year, it might possibly continue till the following year.

He also said that if JAPAN were to go to war with AMERICA, GERMANY would, of course, join in immediately, and HITLER's intention was that there should be absolutely no question of GERMANY making a separate peace with ENGLAND.

At the end of this talk RIBBENTROP asked that the substance of it should be kept strictly secret, so please pay special attention to its handling.

This telegram has been given to the Naval and Military Attachés and to Vice-Admiral NOMURA and Major-General ABE. Please have it shown to the Army and Navy.

OSHIMA.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese instructions regarding cypher machines and codes

BJ/88.

No.: 098563

Date: 5th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese (? Ambassador), HANOI etc.

No: 2444 Circular. Secret.

Date: 1st December, 1941.

Instructions have been sent to LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE and MANILA to discard the cypher machine, and BATAVIA's machine has been returned to JAPAN.

Notwithstanding my circular telegram No. 2447 (see below), WASHINGTON is retaining its machine and machine code.

BERNE to repeat to VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and ANGORA. WASHINGTON to repeat to BRAZIL, ARGENTINE and MEXICO.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, ROME etc.

No: 2447 Circular of 2nd December, 1941.

Instructions have been sent to the following to burn all telegraphic codes except one copy each of OITE and L:

North AMERICA (including HONOLULU), CANADA, PANAMA, (one group corrupt), South Seas (including (one group: ? Portuguese) TIMOR), SINGORA, CHIENMAI, British possessions (including Embassy in LONDON), and Dutch possessions.

Togo.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc

BJ/89.

No: 098577

Date: 5th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Consul, MOMBASA [and other posts unspecified].

No: 2446. Circular.

Date: 2nd December, 1941.

(Secret).

Immediately on receipt of this telegram you are to carry out the following instructions with the greatest care and as inconspicuously as possible.

(a) Burn all cyphers except one copy each of "O" and "L". As soon as you have done this immediately telegraph the one word HARUNA en clair.

(b) Burn all files of in and out telegrams and all secret and confidential documents.

These are precautions envisaging an emergency, and you should therefore redouble [rest of text corrupt: ? precautions in the discharge of your duties].

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese Code Words for Telegraphing to Notify Critical Condition of Situation

No: 09S602

Date: 6th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.

No: 2409 Circular.

Date: 27th November, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

The following is the method of telegraphing secret code words to notify the critical condition of the situation.

Using the names on the first column a plain language text will be made up on some ordinary subject. The second column will contain the information which it is desired to send.

(Example:

"Collision between Japanese and Soviet armies" will appear in the text under date [? 15th] as "Junior Secretaries HIJIKATA and KUBOTA are ordered for duty at your post. STOP").

Further telegrams sent by this method will all end with the word "STOP" to distinguish them from other communications. The word "OWARI" ["—end"] will therefore not be used.

Arimura: cypher communications prohibited.

Asai: communicate by wireless broadcast.

Asakura: listen carefully for wireless communication by broadcast.

Asikaga:	jamming by oversea broadcasts reception impossible.
Azuma:	pressure on JAPAN becoming greater.
Edoguti:	prepare for evacuation.
Hanabusa:	evacuation preparations made.
Hanazono:	proceed with preparations for requesting suitable foreign envoy (consulate) to protect Japanese interests.
Hatakeyama:	diplomatic relations severed between Japan and
Hattori:	relations between JAPAN and are extremely critical.
Hijikata:	collision between Japanese and armies.
Hosino:	JAPAN is engaged with on the whole front.
Ibaragi:	telegraph time at which rupture of diplomatic relations between JAPAN and country to which you are accredited anticipated.
Inagaki:	has telegram been received on the matter of ?
Ishikawa:	telegram received on the matter of
Kashiwagi:	positive action has begun against
Kobayakawa:	stop granting Japanese entry and transit visas to nationals.
Kodama:	Japan.
Komiyama:	China.
Koyanagi:	Great Britain.
Kubota:	U. S. S. R.
Kuribara:	France.
Kusunoki:	Germany.
Matsutani:	Italy.
Minami:	United States of America.
Miwata:	Canada.
Miyazaki:	Mexico.
Morokoshi:	[? Brazil].
Motizuki:	Panama.
Nagamine:	Argentine.

Nakazato:	Thailand.
Nangō:	England and America.
Teigi:	Dutch East Indies.
Ogawa:	Burma.
Okamoto:	Malaya.
Okumura:	Australia.
Onizuka:	Union of [? South Africa].
Nodera:	enemy country.
Otani:	[? the individual in question].
Onishi:	year.
Sibuya:	next year.
Simanaka:	this year.
Sakukibara:	month.
Sigeno I:	[? day].
San Zyō:	time.
Itirō:	one.
Nisaku:	2
Santarō:	3
Yoiti:	4
Gorō:	5
[? Ma] Sa Roku:	6
Simetarō:	7
Yasokiti:	8
Hisumatu:	9
Atumi:	0 (zero).

Togo.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

To: Japanese Consul-General, Singapore
[and other posts unspecified].

No: 2461 Circular of 3rd December, 1941.

Secret:

Duplicates of secret code words (including those for use in broadcasting*) are to be kept until the last moment. If anyone has already burnt them he should inform me by telegram and they will be telegraphed again.

Togo.

[Dept: Note: *These are presumably those given in our No. 098127].

Japanese orders for destruction of cyphers, etc.

BJ/90

No: 098603

Date: 6th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

To: Japanese Ambassador, London.

No: 2445 Circular. (Secret).

Date: 2nd December, 1941.

Please take the following action without delay and see to it that no word of it leaks out to outsiders.

1. Except for one copy each of the O, E, H, P, G, and L codes and the Character Code, all telegraphic codes (including the cypher books for intercommunication between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine) to be burnt.

2. When this has been done, the one word "HARUNA" to be telegraphed.

3. The files of all incoming and outgoing telegrams and all other confidential documents to be burnt.

4. Taking all possible care not to arouse outside suspicion, all secret documents to be treated in the same way.

As these are precautions envisaging an emergency, you should communicate this to no one but members of your staff and you should redouble your attention to your duties and maintain your calmness and self-respect.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. A Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

From: Japanese Chargé, London.

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

No: 790 of 3rd December, 1941.

HARUNA [see paragraph 2 of telegram above].

Japanese code words for telegraphing to notify critical condition of situation

No. 098604

Date: 6th December, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.

No: 2421 Circular.

Date: 29th November, 1941.

Additions to list given in my circular No. 2409 [our No. 098602].

(To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher).

Kasima:	Have residents been interned?
Kanoo:	All residents are safe.
Kikuti:	All residents have been interned.
Katuno:	Some residents have been interned.
Kawasimo:	General Information. Wave-length changed to . . . k/cs from . . . [month] . . . [day].
Kakao:	General Information. Sensitivity bad; please change wave-length.
Tujikita:	General Information. Please change to shorter wave-length.
Tabuse:	General Information. Please change to longer wave-length.
Saitoo:	General Information. Time of broadcast changing on . . . [day] from . . . [time] to . . . [time].
Kakasaki:	General Information. Please change time of broadcast from . . . [day] from . . . [time] to . . . [time].
Isezaki:	Hundred.
Wanami:	Thousand.
Yasu [RYO]:	0,000.
Uno:	00,000.
Itimata:	000,000.

Director (3). F. O. (3). F. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. War Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese code words for telegraphing to notify critical condition of situation

No. 098608

Date: 6th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, RIO etc.

No.: 2432. Circular.

Date: 29th November, 1941.

As the following additions have been made for use in connection with your area only, please add them to the list already sent to you. (See our Nos. 098602 and 098604).

Asahima:	The supplying of fuel to Japanese ships putting into Port has been stopped from . . . (date).
Date:	Please telegraph what quantity of . . . can be bought.
Kawabara:	It is thought that about . . . tons of . . . can be bought.
Niwaii Quti:	Purchase of . . . impossible.
Mukamuta:	Negotiations for purchase of . . . in progress.
Mukakata:	(? Please) communicate via . . . (name of country).
Kazania:	Communications (? to be carried out) via diplomatic mission in . . . (name of country).
Tokusima:	Japanese ship due . . . (name of country) on . . . (month) . . . (day).

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir K. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Takemouti :	Can a Japanese ship visit . . . (name of country).
Yahagi :	Impossible to despatch Japanese ship to . . . (name of country).
Tonagi :	Japanese ship can be sent to . . . (name of country).
Takagi :	Metal.
Sawamura :	Lead.
Hasumi :	Mercury.
Iwasaki :	Coal.
Mikokata :	Diamonds for industrial use.
Iyami :	Platinum.
Kada :	Copper.
Makagawa :	Carat.
Makhata :	PERU.
Masuko :	CHILE.
Hakada :	COLOMBIA.
Takekaka :	(? URUGUAY).
Simazu :	(? PARAGUAY).
Ihazawa :	VENEZUELA.
Fujikaka :	SAN (? DOMINGO).
Hasimoto :	(? ECUADOR).
Simeo :	HAVANA.
Tali Ki :	(? RIO).
Tokawa :	(? BOLIVIA).
Hasegawa :	River PLATE.
Iri— Ine :	SANTOS.
Ksomoto :	(Bauru, sic. ? PAULO).
Bappu :	CURITIBA.
Tekamatu :	(? BELEM).
Suatugu :	BUENOS AIRES.
Suzuki :	SANTIAGO.
Yamato :	LIMA.
Uskgawa :	BOGOTA.
Hara :	CARACAS.
Isono :	?
Fukamati :	ASUNCION.

Japanese-American negotiations account sent to Japanese Ambassador, Berlin.

No. 098633.

Date: 7th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

No. 986.

Date: 30th November 1941.

(Dept. Note: First paragraph missing).

2. The present Cabinet has therefore continued the negotiations (with AMERICA) hitherto on an equitable basis though at the same time exercising every care to safeguard JAPAN's authority and existence.

Amongst the most knotty points in these negotiations has been the conflict in the respective opinions regarding the question of withdrawing troops (withdrawal of troops from CHINA and INDO CHINA was demanded) etc., but to judge by circumstances in the negotiations hitherto, the fundamental obstacle has been the traditional policy of AMERICA with regard to the conduct of international relations, that is to say her adherence to the same fundamental principles as were expressed in the recent Anglo-American talks at sea (? i. e. the Atlantic Charter). In short, AMERICA's real intention is to veto and obstruct the establishment of the New Order in EUROPE and ASIA by JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY (i. e. the purpose of the Tripartite Pact), their view being that Japanese-American relations cannot be maintained on a friendly basis so long as JAPAN makes common cause with GERMANY and ITALY, and, acting on this view, they have to all intents and purposes demanded JAPAN's renunciation of the Tripartite Pact. This has brought the negotia-

tions to their final stage, and, as the talks of the last few days have made this matter still more clear, JAPAN has been compelled to realize that to continue the negotiations any longer cannot be expected to serve any useful purpose.

3. Again, the proposals presented by the American Government on the 26th made the above attitude even clearer, the clause affecting the Tripartite Pact being worded: "It is agreed that any treaty which either of the two Governments may have concluded with a third country shall not be construed as conflicting with the principles of this treaty, in other words, with the maintenance of peace in all regions of the PACIFIC" It is apparent that this was planned with the object of restricting the interpretation of JAPAN's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, and thereby of making JAPAN refrain from giving support to GERMANY and ITALY in the event of American participation in the (group corrupt. ! European) war, and to judge by this clause alone it has been realised that, quite apart from all other questions, it would be impossible for the American proposals to be made (group corrupt: ! the subject of) negotiations. Moreover the fact is that the American Government held constant discussions with GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, and the Dutch before presenting their proposals, and hence it can be seen that AMERICA is at present (? acting in common) with these countries and regards JAPAN as an enemy together with GERMANY and ITALY.

Director (3). P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). Ind. Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Major Norton. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion Office.

Japanese Ambassador, Rome, reports interview with Mussolini.

No: 098650

Date: 7th December, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, ROME.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

Date: 3rd December, 1941.

(Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine).

Reference your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 098452).

Accompanied by ANDO I saw the Duce, MUSSOLINI, (CIANO also was present) at 11 a.m. on the 3rd. I first gave him an outline of the Japanese-American negotiations as set forth in your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 098633). MUSSOLINI said he had been following the negotiations from their inception until to-day with the greatest attention, and my communication had caused him no surprise. There was no doubt that the present situation was the natural result of the (? obstinacy) of the American Government and of President ROOSEVELT's policy of intervention. The plutocrats of AMERICA aimed at the economic exploitation of Eastern ASIA for their own benefit, and wanted to detach JAPAN from the Axis and intervene in the European war. He had always known from the beginning that JAPAN, who was faithful and loyal, would not respond to such an attitude on AMERICA's part, negotiations or no negotiations. As I and my predecessor knew, he was a whole-hearted supporter of JAPAN's fundamental policy for the establishment of a New Order in East ASIA, and as it was in the past, so it was in the present and would be in the future. He firmly believed that JAPAN, as a natural right, would be the leader of Great East ASIA.

Director (3). P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Major Norton. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion Office.

I then spoke on the lines of your telegram under reference ([This passage in brackets is not clear. The sense seems to be: "With regard to paragraph 3 of your telegram, it was to be done as one copy between our Ambassador in BERLIN and RIBBENTROP and talks of some sort were in progress. I should like him to ask the German Ambassador about it."]). With regard to paragraph 2 in your telegram MUSSOLINI said that if war broke out ITALY would give military support to the best of her power; that is to say she would do her best to keep the British Navy in the MEDITERRANEAN. Moreover GERMANY and ITALY to-

gether had recently established an air blockade and were trying to put further pressure on BRITAIN in the MEDITERRANEAN. Also with regard to [? 2 ? 3], he was ready to sign to-day. I therefore asked further with regard to 2 if ITALY would do this at once if JAPAN declared war on BRITAIN and on AMERICA. He replied that in accordance with the Three Power Pact naturally she would. As, however, it would be necessary to do it simultaneously with GERMANY, they would have to go through the formality of consulting with GERMANY. With regard to 3, I submitted the [one group] translation in your telegram No. 237 [not received], and asked which procedure he preferred, a single copy or separate copies. He replied that it should be done simultaneously with GERMANY, but he did not much mind what form it took. If it were possible a single copy would give a greater impression of strength. He would at once consult MACKENSEN on this point.

At this meeting MUSSOLINI asked me questions about the Russian question, and I therefore did not refer to it.

Repeated to BERLIN.

HORIKIRI.

Japan and the Axis, Proposed Three-Power Pact.

No: 098651

Date: 7th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 782.

Date: 5th December, 1941.

Reference my telegram No. 775. [Not received].

Accompanied by ARDO I had an interview with the Foreign Minister CIANO on the 5th at his request.

CIANO showed me the Italian text of the draft of a Three-Power Pact to which GERMANY and ITALY have agreed, (BERLIN will have telegraphed this to you, I imagine), regarding participation in the war and not making an independent armistice or independent peace. He said that if the Japanese would agree to this it could be signed at any time. The procedure could be arranged by conversations between BERLIN and TOKYO and then all the parties could sign.

Repeated by telegram to BERLIN.

HORIKIRI.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir H. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese Foreign Minister's View of Washington Conversations.

No: 098671.

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN, etc.

No: 2416 Circular.

Date: 28th November, 1941.

[Dept: Note: Very corrupt text].

(Chef de Mission cypher).

With regard to the Japanese-American negotiations, the counter-proposal made by the Americans on the 27th ignores the position of JAPAN and cannot be considered for a moment. It seems, therefore, that there is nothing for it but to discontinue the negotiations. The situation is that it is impossible to guarantee that within a few days from now there will be no [? change in] the relations of JAPAN with BRITAIN and AMERICA.

This is for your personal information only.

Togo.

Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D.

Japanese Broadcasting.

No: 098673

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, RIO DE JANEIRO.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 482.

Date: 30th November, 1941.

Recently at this post, we have been testing general news reception.

At present it is quite impossible [group corrupt: ? to hear] the 10.30 p. m. Tokyo time, broadcast and, for the time being, please note that we are only listening to JVJ's [group corrupt: ? JZJ's] broadcasts directed to American states at 6.30 p. m., Tokyo time. The same, I understand, applies to Argentina.

Actually, reception conditions here are considered best between 4 a. m. and 6 a. m., Tokyo time, and I consider it would be most advantageous to use this period for South American broadcasts. Two wave-lengths [of frequencies] between 10 and 15 magacycles [group corrupt: ? are suggested].

Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. M. I. 5.

Japanese Ambassador, Bangkok, Wishes to Burn Codes.

No: 098674

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 883.

Date: 30th November, 1941.

In view of the state of emergency, I should like to burn all telegraphic codes except those set out below. Please wire at once whether you have any objection.

YO, KA, OITE, TO, TSU, FUJI, X. [Group corrupt]. MATSU with No. 1 rules for use, directions for using "B" machine (KO-OTSU [(a)-(b)]) and the machine code—one of each of the above.

L, YAKKO [—NU]—two of each.

Further, I should like to burn all shipping codes, naval codes and codes for use between the three Ministries. Please negotiate with the Departments concerned and telegraph instructions.

Director. F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.

No. 098693

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 1416.

Date: 5th December, 1941.

[Dept: Note: See our No. 088551].

(Chef de Mission Cypher).

Reference my No. 1407 [not received].

I called on RIBBENTROP at his request at 3 a. m. on the 5th. He made a formal reply that they accepted the two points put forward by us. My following telegram gives the draft Treaty which he gave me in this connection.

OSIIMA.

No: 1417 of 5th December, 1941.

(Chef de Mission Cypher).

(1. The last part of the Agreement is in the same form as the Three Power Treaty.

2. The place of signature is BERLIN.)

[Dept: Note: Translation follows at end of text].

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. 5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

(Part of German text in original illegible.)

Artikel 1

Falls zwischen Deutschland und Italien einerseits und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika andererseits der Kriegszustand eintritt, wird sich Japan sofort auch seinerseits als im Kriegszustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten befindlich betrachten und diesen Krieg mit allen ihm zur Verfügung stehenden Machtmitteln führen.

Artikel 2.

Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, im Falle eines gemäss Artikel 1 dieses Abkommens von den drei Mächten gemeinsam gegen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika geführten Krieges ohne volles [gegen]seitiges Einverständnis keinen Waffenstillstand oder Frieden mit den Vereinigten Staaten zu schliessen.

Sie übernehmen die gleiche Verpflichtung auch hinsichtlich eines Waffenstillstands oder Friedens mit England für den Fall, dass zwischen Japan und England der Kriegszustand eintritt.

Artikel 3.

Die drei Regierungen sind darüber einig, dass dieses Abkommen auf das strengste geheim gehalten wird. Sie werden jedoch die von ihnen in Artikel 2 übernommene Verpflichtung in einer noch zu verabredenden Form bekanntgeben, sobald sich Deutschland, Italien und Japan gemeinsam im Kriegszustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika oder England oder mit diesen beiden Mächten befinden.

Artikel 4.

Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft und bleibt ebenso lange wie der am 27. September 1940 abgeschlossene Dreimächtepakt in Geltung.

OSHIMA.

Translation

In view of the increasingly obvious desire of the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND to bring to nought a just New Order with all the armed forces at their disposal and to cut off the means of existence of the German, Italian and Japanese peoples, the German Government, the Italian Government and the Japanese Government have, in order to ward off these grave threats to the existence of their peoples, jointly resolved on the following:

Article (1).

Should a state of war arise between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES, GERMANY and ITALY for their part shall also consider themselves to be at war with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with all the armed forces at their disposal.

Should a state of war arise between GERMANY and ITALY on the one hand and the UNITED STATES on the other, JAPAN for her part shall consider herself to be at war with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with all the armed forces at her disposal.

Article (2).

GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN bind themselves in the event of a war waged jointly by the Three Powers against the UNITED STATES according to Article (1) of this Treaty, not to conclude any armistice or peace with the UNITED STATES without full mutual agreement.

They undertake a similar obligation regarding an armistice or peace with ENGLAND, should a state of war arise between JAPAN and ENGLAND.

Article (3).

The three Governments are in full agreement that this agreement shall be kept most strictly secret. They shall, however, announce in a form yet to be decided, the undertakings assumed in Article (2), as soon as GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN find themselves jointly at war with the UNITED STATES of AMERICA or with ENGLAND or with both these Powers.

Article (4).

This agreement comes into force immediately on signature and remains in force as long as the Three Power Pact concluded on 27th September 1940.

Japanese Notification of "Extremely Critical" Relations with Great Britain and United States

BJ/91

No. 098694

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
 To: Japanese Embassy, LONDON, etc.
 No. 2494 Circular.
 Date: 7th December, 1941.

Relations between JAPAN and GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES are extremely critical.

JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER.

[Dept. Note: This telegram was sent in plain language with the special code words inserted given in our No. 098602. It was despatched from TOKYO at 1150 hours OMT on 7th December 1941, i. e. Japan Time 8.50 p. m. on 7th December 1941].

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). Indian Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.

No: 098696

Date: 8th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
 To: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
 No. 1004. Most immédiate.
 Date: 7th December, 1941.

[Dept: Note: In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].

Reference your Nos. 1418 and 1419 [these telegrams were received in corrupt and fragmentary form. The former appears to deal with Russian supplies and the latter with the draft treaty].

We are in complete agreement with GERMANY's counter-proposals. Accordingly there is no objection to initialling right away and formally signing as soon as the [group corrupt: ? necessary] procedure has been completed. However, the situation may take a sudden turn and we cannot tell whether a [group corrupt] collision may not occur in the interval before the formal signing is performed. Thus, supposing we initial now, it must be understood that for the actual signing, the text proposed by GERMANY may not apply to the existing circumstances (for example, clauses like No. 1 will be unnecessary if GERMANY and ITALY join in the war without delay).

[Two groups] I wish you to see RIBBENTROP immediately and explain the above particulars confidentially to him. Also make clear that it is the expectation of the Imperial Government that if war breaks out between JAPAN and AMERICA before the formal signature of the agreement, GERMANY and ITALY will immediately participate.

Director (3). P. O. (3). P. L. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M. I. S. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

As regards the text of the agreement, [group corrupt: ? please negotiate] only for the stipuation concerning the non-conclusion of a separate peace. Respecting GERMANY, please refer to the text in my No. 997 (not received). Further, discuss with GERMANY whether the formal signing should be made public after GERMANY and ITALY have joined in the war and telegraph the reply.

Please repeat to ROME.

Far Eastern War: Question of German and Italian Participation

RJ/92.

No: 098722

Date: 9th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 1432. Most immediate.

Date: 8th December, 1941.

(Chef de Mission cypher).

At 11 p. m. to-day, the 7th, I received a radio report that hostilities had broken out between JAPAN and AMERICA, and at once called an RIBBENTROP. He said that from reports which he too had received he thought this was true, and that therefore, although he had not yet secured HITLER's sanction, the immediate participation in the war by GERMANY and ITALY was a matter of course. The secret agreement had in consequence already become —?—, and [? they had decided] to drop it * * * [a portion is lost here] * * * Form of German and Italian participation. RIBBENTROP said he would discuss with me to-morrow, the 8th, about the time of publication of this declaration and so on.

RIBBENTROP rang up CIANO then and there and notified him of the foregoing.

Director (23. P. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir H. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Far Eastern War: Text of Japanese-German-Italian Agreement

BJ/98

No. 098760

Date: 10th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No. 1440. Most Immediate.

Date: 8th December, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.

Reference my No. 1432. (Our No. 088722).

The text of the agreement, after consultation with GERMANY, is given below. An explanation follows in my separate telegram.

In dem unerschütterlichen Entschluss, die Waffen nicht niederzulegen, bis der gemeinsame Krieg gegen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und England zum erfolgreichen Ende geführt worden ist, haben sich die Deutsche Regierung, die Italienische Regierung und die Japanische Regierung über folgende Bestimmungen geeinigt:

Artikel 1.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden den ihnen von den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und England aufgezwungenen Krieg mit allen ihnen zu Gebote stehenden Machtmitteln gemeinsam bis zum siegreichen Ende führen.

Artikel 2.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, ohne volles gegenseitiges Einverständnis weder mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika noch mit England Waffenstillstand oder Frieden zu schliessen.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Artikel 3.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden nach siegreicher Beendigung des Krieges zum Zwecke der Herbeiführung einer gerechten Neuordnung auf das engste zusammenarbeiten.

Artikel 4.—Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft. Zu Urkunde dessen haben die Unterzeichneten, von ihren Regierungen gehörig bevollmächtigt, dieses Abkommen unterzeichnet und mit ihren Siegeln versehen.

Ausgefertigt in dreifacher Urschrift in deutscher, italienischer und japanischer Sprache, in Berlin am . . . Dezember 1941 im 20ten Jahre der Faschistischen Ära—entsprechend dem Tage des 12ten Monats des 16ten Jahres der Ära Syowa.

No. 1441 of 8th December, 1941.

With reference to my telegram No. 1440 [see above].

From 5 p. m. to-day myself, RIBBENTROP, KASE, USHIDA, and GAUSS put our heads together on this matter of the declaration of the non-conclusion of a separate peace with a view to imparting to this declaration the loftiest possible significance, and produced the text of the agreement contained in my telegram under reference. This goes beyond the adoption of our proposal in regard to a promise of nonconclusion of a separate peace (Clause II) to the following extent:

(a) The Three Powers' firm intention to fight together against Anglo-American aggression until final victory is expressed in Clause II.

(b) Cooperation with a view to the establishment of a new order after the war is promised in Clause III.

Thereby the significance of this war is elucidated, while at the same time Clause III has an advantage from the point of view of obtaining German and Italian cooperation when the Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere is established after the war, this, I believe, being in accord with the views of the Japanese Government. I hope therefore that the above text will be adopted unless there are any serious objections, and that the formalities for signature may be completed promptly. I would add that in the meantime the Germans have notified me that the Italian Government is in complete agreement with this proposal.

2. Ribbentrop said that he would like the publication of this agreement to take place on the 10th and immediately afterwards hoped to stage a big demonstration. He was unable at the moment to say what kind of demonstration this would be but it was sure to be something distinctly favourable to JAPAN, and he was most anxious that signature should be on the 10th. I therefore told him that this could not be undertaken in view of formalities in JAPAN, but as it is likely to be helpful to us if we play our part in falling in with GERMANY's intention I would suggest that you push on with the formalities as fast as possible with a view to prompt signature. Should signature on the 10th not be possible please reply immediately by telegram on what date it can be accomplished.

3. Just as this very talk was in progress RIBBENTROP received the Imperial Headquarters report of the victory in which the American battleships were sunk, and was greatly delighted and praised highly the daring of our Navy.

No: 1442 of 8th December, 1941.

Most immediate. Secret.

Reference my No. 1440. [See above.]

As the matter is urgent, I have tentatively complied the Japanese text given below. If you have no objections I should like to take this as the (Japanese) text of the agreement. Please telegraph your reply at once.

The Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government with the inflexible determination not to lay down their arms in the joint war against the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE until final victory is achieved have made the following agreement.

1. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY will conjointly prosecute the war forced upon them by the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE will all the means at their disposal until victory is attained.

2. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, except by mutual consent, undertake not to conclude a separate [Dept. Note: the Japanese word used means literally "arbitrary" "self-willed"] armistice and/or peace with the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE or with either of them.

3. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, after victory is attained, will cooperate closely in the establishment of an equitable New Order.

4. This agreement will come into force simultaneously with its signature. In witness whereof, the undermentioned, having received competent authority from their respective countries, have set their seals this — day of the 12th month of the 16th year of the Showa Bra Era i. e. — December 1941 or the — day of December of the 20th year of the Fascist Era, in BERLIN, the said agreement having been drawn up in Japanese, German and Italian.

Japanese Instructions to Embassy, Rio, etc. to burn cyphers etc

BJ/97.

No: 098786

Date: 10th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

To: Japanese Ambassador, Rio De Janeiro, etc.

No. 2318 Circular.

Date: 8th December, 1941.

Immediate and Confidential

1. On receipt of this telegram please burn the following, leaving one copy of each, NU, CITE, TSU, L and X. Depending on the situation, it will also be all right to burn the remaining codes, but please keep TSU as long as possible and leave CITE and L to the last.

2. Please leave one copy each of HIMOKI and the Machine Code in current use (including the rules for use between our Embassy in England (sic) and us -- only MEXICO does not possess these). But if in view of the situation you wish at any time to destroy them please telegraph me.

3. With regard to the files of my telegrams and other secret documents please watch developments and adopt suitable means of destroying them.

4. In the event of your completing the above, telegraph me the one word JURYO. If you have destroyed TSU the word SHOTI, if CITE and L have been destroyed the word ANZEN.

5. If you have in your care telegraphic codes of other Posts please destroy them all.

Director (3). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2) Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office. M. I. 5.

Japanese Codes to be Destroyed at Bangkok

No: 098800

Date: 11th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
No: 881. Confidential.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.

In reply to your telegram No. 863. [Our No. 098674]. I agree with your request, to which there is no objection. But please transfer one copy of OITZ to SINGORA for safe keeping. Please destroy the codes for use between the three Ministries; also all the naval code books. The codes remaining after consultation with the posts concerned and the cypher machine[s] please deposit in the special safe. Please be sure that this is carried out.

Director. F.O.(3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.

Japanese Broadcasting: Reception in Bangkok

No: 098801

Date: 11th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 902.
Date: 4th December, 1941.

At 10:30 p. m. J.A.P.'s selectivity is gradually improving.

We look for broadcasts at this hour and also for JUP at 6:30 p. m.

Director. F.O.(3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Dominions Office.

Japanese Consul, Dublin, Reports—Destruction of Cyphers

No: 098831

Date: 12th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Vice-Consul, DUBLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date: 7th December, 1941. 1040 hours.

*HARUNA,
Japanese Consul.

[Dept. Note: *See paragraph 2 of TOKYO circular telegram No. 2445 of 2nd December, 1941, our No. 098803].

Director. F.O.(3). Dominions Office.

Japanese Vice-Consul, Ouritiba, Reports—Destruction of Cyphers, etc.

No: 098832

Date: 12th DECEMBER, 1941.

From: The Japanese Vice-Consul, OURITIBA.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date: 10th December, 1941. 2040 hours.

*JURYO,
Komine.

[Dept: Note: *See Tokyo circular telegram No. 2318 of 8th December, 1941, paragraph 4, our No. 098786].

Director. F.O.(3). M.I.5.

Japan and the Axis: Signature of Treaty

BJ/101.

No: 098833

Date: 12th DECEMBER, 1941.
From: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No. 1451.
Date: 10th December, 1941.

(Dept: Note. See our No. 098760, BJ/98).

Reference your telegram No. 1013. (Not received).

I have received the whole of the Japanese text. I called on the Foreign Minister at noon to-day, 10th, and arranged for signature on the 11th at 1100 hours Berlin time and for publication at 1600 hours. Accordingly please publish at 2300

hours in JAPAN.

OSHIMA.

Director (-). F. O. (3). P. I. D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office, (2). Colonial Office. — Ministry. Sir B. Bridges. Dominions Office.

*JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, BERLIN, AUTHORIZED TO SIGN THREE-
POWER TREATY*

No: 098846

Date: 12th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 1016.

Date: 10th December, 1941.

(Dept: Note: See our No. 098760).

Most immediate.

To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.

My telegram No. 1013. (Not received).

For your information, the following is a translation into German of the document giving you power and authority to sign:

(Übersetzung).

TOKYO, den . . . Dezember des sechzehnten Jahres von Shōwa.

(Amtliches Insiegel).

Der Minister des Auswärtigen Amtes, Shigenori TOGO.

An den Ausserordentlichen und Bevollmächtigt— Botschafter in BERLIN, Herrn OSHIMA.

Seine Majestät der Kaiser haben nachdem die Beratung des kaiserlichen geheimen Staatsrates abgeschlossen ist, mit dem heutigen Datum den

Abschluss

Director.

F. —. (3).

P. I. D.

Abschluss des Abkommens zwischen JAPAN, DEUTSCHLAND und ITALIEN zu bewilligen geruht.

Sie sind bevollmächtigt, das oben genannte Abkommen zu unterzeichnen und zu siegeln.

(Translation of German given above is as follows:—

(Translation).

TOKYO, the —th December, in the 16th year of the Shōwa Era.

(Office Seal).

Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO,

To Mr. OSHIMA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at BERLIN.

Upon the advice of the Imperial Privy Council, His Majesty the Emperor is pleased to agree to the conclusion of a Pact, dated to-day, between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY.

You are empowered to sign and seal the aforesaid Pact).

Japan and the Axis: Text of Three-Power Treaty

Re:

Date: 12th December, 1941.

From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.

No: 1010.

Date: 9th December, 1941.

To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.

At 9 p. m. to-day the German Ambassador called on me and we had a second interview when he submitted the new draft of the text. You will already have received this, I expect.

In regard to this text I said that this involved the 1st paragraph of Article 3 of the Three-Power Treaty, and suggested the removal of Article 3. At the same time, I said, if GERMANY stuck to the retention of this Article, after the words "an equitable New Order" in that same Article should be added "in the Three-Power Treaty concluded on 27th September, 1940". Article 4 should therefore be amended to read "This pact shall come into force at the time of its signature and its period of validity shall be identical with that of the Three-Power Treaty concluded on the 27th September, 1940".

The Japanese text is given in my immediately following telegram. (See below.)

[The remainder of the telegram gives instructions for telegraphing the texts in the three languages to enable the formalities in JAPAN to be concluded. See Dept. Note: at end of TOKYO-BERLIN No. 1011 of 9th December, 1941. (See below)].

TOGO.

Director (3).

F. O. (3).

P. I. D.

Admiralty.

War Office (3).

India Office (2).

Colonial Office.

Air Ministry.

Sir E. Bridges.

Dominion Office.

No. 1011 of the 9th December, 1941.

Reference my immediately preceding telegram No. 1010. (See above).

(To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher).

Pact between JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY.

In the inflexible resolve not to lay down their arms till the joint war against the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND has been successfully concluded, the Japanese, German, and Italian Governments have jointly agreed as follows:

Article 1.

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will fight together with all the resources at their command until victory is achieved over the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND.

Article 2.

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY undertake not to make a separate armistice or separate peace with the UNITED STATES or ENGLAND without full mutual understanding.

Article 3.

JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will after the victorious conclusion of the war collaborate closely in establishing an equitable New Order in the spirit of the Three-Power Treaty signed on 27th September, 1940.

Article 4

This Pact shall come into force at the time of signature.

As witness whereof the undermentioned plenipotentiaries etc.

Signed in triplicate in Japanese, German and Italian at BERLIN (dates).

TOGO.

(Dept. Note: The German and Italian versions of the above were cabled to TOKYO from BERLIN as Nos. 1450 and 1453 respectively, dated 10th December, 1941).

MOST SECRET.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY: NEVER TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE.

JAPANESE BROADCASTS OF GENERAL INFORMATION REPORTS.

No. 098971

Date: 16th December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, AMGORA, etc.

No: 2548 Circular. Secret.

Date: 11th December, 1941.

From 10.30 p. m. 11th December, general information reports will be sent on the 9450 wavelength [? with the call sign] JUO.

TOGO.

Director.

P. O. (3).

P. I. D.

Admiralty.

War Office (3).

Air Ministry.

M. I. 5.

Sir E. Bridges.

JAPANESE NAVAL PLANS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC

No. 099199

Date: 22nd December, 1941.

From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

To: Japanese Ambassador, Buenos Aires.

No. 288.

Date: 9th December, 1941.

[The first part of this telegram recounts the events that led up to the outbreak of war from the Japanese point of view—Japanese patience and A. B. C. D. encirclement. Part II follows].

2. The Imperial Japanese forces, however, right at the outset and in one heavy attack, have achieved the following: two battleships sunk, four severely damaged, four heavy cruisers severely damaged (three are confirmed), one aircraft-carrier sunk and over one hundred aircraft destroyed. It may be said that the main strength of the American Pacific Fleet has been practically annihilated.

From now on the Imperial (Japanese) Navy will be able to extend the scope of its (? activities) little by little to the South Atlantic and South Pacific and it is clear at least that we shall obtain command of the seas in the South Pacific before long. Even, therefore, if economic intercourse between JAPAN and the South American States bordering the Pacific be cut off for the time being, it will not be long before communication is restored. Not only so, but intercourse with ARGENTINA and BRAZIL by merchant ships in convoy will be urged upon these

two countries, while sea communication with BRITAIN, AMERICA, and Latin AMERICA will, on the other hand, be severed (? shortly) by the Imperial (Japanese) Navy.

Director (3).

F. C. (3). (Dept. Note: Part III of this telegram missing)

P. I. D.

Admiralty.

War Office (3).

India Office (2).

Colonial Office.

Air Ministry.

M. E. W. (2).

Sir E. Bridges.

Dominions Office.

INDEX TO EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parentheses following the description)

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION
1.	Page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables mentioned in the affidavit of Mary L. Ross. (Exhibit B, p. 74.)
2.	Table A (p. 1) showing the distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the Mandates. (Exhibit B, p. 130.)
3.	<i>Ibid</i> , (p. 2). Exhibit B, p. 131.)
4.	Map of Palao Islands. (Exhibit B, p. 132.)
5.	Sketch of Malakal Harbor. (Exhibit B, p. 133.)
6.	Sketch of Jaluit Harbor. (Exhibit B, p. 135.)
7.	Photostatic copy of a portion of the <i>Honolulu Star-Bulletin</i> dated 18 September 1941 relating to reported talk of General Short. Exhibit 1, p. 2SE.)
8.	Photostatic copy of a portion of the <i>Honolulu Star-Bulletin</i> (undated) relating to reported talk of Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 2, p. 92.)
9.	Copy of a routing slip of Latin American Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, dated 30 June 1941. Exhibit 2, p. 92.)
10.	Outline map of the Island of Oahu—Appendix B (Exhibit 5, p. 197D.)
11.	Chart captioned "Pattern for Espionage, Hawaiian Islands"—Appendix C (Exhibit 5, p. 198D.)
12.	Outline Map of Thailand and French Indochina. (Exhibit 6, p. 53C.)

OUTGOING CABLES

*R/S Ser. No.	Message Center Number	Message Sent To	C 1 a s a.	Time Message Sent To Message Center	C 1 s r k	Drafting Officer & Branch	SUBJECT
1	26	Mexico	r	9:30A	32	MA WMA/BAP	Col. Weeks will arrive about Jan 10.
2	Thru AGC	Comm. Inf. Schl Ft. Benning, Ga.		10:10A	32	TE ACK	AG 350-2(11-3-41)T-B/ MID 350.2 Ref yr radio 12/3 To F/L Offer AGC & AG lettr 11/7 to C.O. Ft. Benning author attachmt Capt. Mahan & Sime Chilean & Unda, Mexican Army, for 2 months frn Dec 1, 1941.
3	707	Manila	s	11:00			
4	519	Hawaii	s	11:35 A	32	RSB	Comm. Rochefort who can be located thr u 14th Naval Dist he sm info on Jap broadcasts in which wea rpts mentnd that you must obtn. Contact him at once.
5	49	Philippines	r				
6	627	London	s	1:25 P	32	A.F. 527	Attn Col. Van Voorst. Advise whethr lavender prints of Brit training films "Cathode Ray Tube"
7	1	Kabul Afghanistan	s	2:30 P	32	EBR F	You may draw 17/6. accrang to yr 1, \$3000 transfrd to yr credit by Col. Dixon.
8	628	London	r	"	40	EBR F	FD 1403 incrd \$1000 reur 12/71 FD1437 \$10,000.
9	43	Turkey	r	"	40	EBR F	Get acct of y-t recd \$5000 reur by Sept. rrlent & adtl \$4000 r std being transfrd to Frp's credit by Col. Dixon 12/8. Authority to...
10	THRU AGC	Warren In- spectors					

1 #C-2 *R/S - Record Section

Date: 1 5 1942

ITEM NO. 1

13024

MARSHALL ISLANDS - JALUIT, HEADQUARTERS.

E CAROLINES - HQ - TRUK

	SLAND (P. AREA.)	B. LINEAR 242 CENT	MILLI	MAJURO	TAKO	MALDELAP	WOTJE	UJAE	UTRIK	POKAKKU	EBON	JABOR-JALUIT	ENYBOR	IMEIJI (EMIDJ)	AILINGLAPALAP	KWALEIN	RUOTTC (ROI)	FRU L 68-68.8 N A 167-14.7 E	UJELANG	ENIWETOK	NERIRIN	RONGELAP	ENAIPOKKU	KUSAH	PINGELAP	FOUAPE	LANGAK	TOL	POULBLOU	PULIYAI	OL-OL (NANKIN)	KAPINGAMAKANGI (RESERVE)	LANO-REK	MONTLOCK	WOLEAI (ANANGAI)	
ARMED OFFICE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
NAV. RADIO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
NAV. STATION & FORCE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
LANDING FIELD			X	X									X																							
SEADLANE									X			X																								X
NAV. BASE																																				
NAV. TECH. UNIT																																				
AIR GROUP																																				
OR AIR CORPS																																				
PUBLIC WORKS DEPT	X	X	X								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
ENGINE UNITS	X	X	X								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
NAVY YARD																																				
UNITS		X	X																																	
RONANCE SPECIALISTS		X	X																																	
FORCE BATTERIES																																				
AS BATTERY IS																																				
LOOKOUT TOWERS & CONTROL STATIONS																																				
METEOROLOGICAL STATION OR FACIL.	X	X	X		X						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
MUNITIONS DEPT											X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
SUPPLY DEPT											X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
BRANCH #																																				
MIL. POST OFFICE																																				
ARMY TROOPS																																				
ESTIMATED NO.																																				
FLEET ANCHORAGE		X	X								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
SEPARATE																																				
ACI																																				

TABLE A (PART ONE)

13024

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

PALAO ISLANDS
(PELID)

KAYANOL
Is.

rumored
Scanlan
Base under
construction.

KOSSOL PASSAGE



Fleet

Anchorage



Observation tower (or
Battery Control Sta-
tion) and Shore Bat-
tery Emplacements
under construction.
Disembled guns re-
cently unloaded from
Transports were "Ten-
foot" barrels six-
inch bore".

NOTE: All Lighthouses are
now undoubtedly being used
for observation posts or
Battery Control Stations.
Informant believes batteries
are emplaced near each light-
house. All are "PROHIBITED
AREAS".

PELELIU Is.



Angaur I.

13

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1942—35 PAGES

ALL PRICES FIVE CENTS

SHORT URGES ONE MAN FOR M-DAY CHIEF

Best Man, Manager of
Trade Better Left in
Civilian Hands

Trade Manager of
the city, who has been
in the city for many
years, is a man of
many talents.



The Trade Manager of the city, who has been in the city for many years, is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents.

He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents.

He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents.

He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents.

He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents.

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He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents. He is a man of many talents.

CLIPPING FROM HONOLULU
 TERRITORY OF HAWAII
 PUBLISHED BY THE HONOLULU
 STAR-BULLETIN
 PUBLISHED DAILY
 EXCEPT SUNDAYS
 AND HOLIDAYS
 PRICE 10 CENTS
 PER COPY
 SUBSCRIPTIONS
 IN ADVANCE
 BY MAIL
 PAYABLE TO THE
 HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN
 P.O. BOX 100
 HONOLULU, T. H.

Honolulu Star-Bulletin

24 PAGES—HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII, U. S.

Admiral Kimmel Calls On Hawaii To Face Realities

Speaker at Defense Week Luncheon Asks Sacrifices Similar To Those Made It Making

Admiral (James H.) Kimmel, commander in chief of the U. S. Pacific fleet, called on Hawaii to face the realities of the war in the Pacific today, and to make the sacrifices similar to those made in the making of the Pacific fleet.



Admiral Kimmel

Highlights Of Today's Talk By Admiral Kimmel

Honolulu, Sept. 16.—Admiral (James H.) Kimmel, commander in chief of the U. S. Pacific fleet, today called on Hawaii to face the realities of the war in the Pacific, and to make the sacrifices similar to those made in the making of the Pacific fleet.

Admiral Kimmel, who arrived here yesterday, spoke at a luncheon given by the Hawaii Defense Council at the Hotel Hale Koa. He was the guest of honor at the event, which was attended by a large number of local officials and citizens.

In his address, the admiral stressed the importance of the Pacific fleet to the defense of the United States, and the need for the Hawaiian Islands to be prepared to support it. He pointed out that the fleet was the backbone of the nation's defense, and that the islands were the key to its success.

Admiral Kimmel said that the fleet had been built through the sacrifices of many men, and that the islands must now make similar sacrifices to support it. He called for a united effort on the part of the Hawaiian people, and for the acceptance of the realities of the war.

The admiral's speech was well received by the audience, and he was greeted with a warm welcome as he left the hotel this morning.

The admiral's visit to Hawaii is part of a tour of the Pacific Islands. He will be in Hawaii for several days, and will then travel to other parts of the Pacific. His visit is being widely publicized, and is expected to draw a large crowd of people to the various events he will attend.

Admiral Kimmel is a highly respected figure in the military, and his visit to Hawaii is a significant event. He has been in command of the Pacific fleet since 1935, and has led it through some of the most difficult times in its history.

His speech today was a powerful reminder of the sacrifices that have been made for the defense of the United States, and the need for continued vigilance. He called for a renewed sense of purpose and determination on the part of the Hawaiian people, and for a commitment to the defense of the nation.

The Hawaii Defense Council, which organized the luncheon, is a group of citizens who are dedicated to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. They have been working to raise funds and provide support for the Pacific fleet, and their efforts are being widely appreciated.

The luncheon was a success, and the admiral's speech was a highlight of the event. It was a reminder of the importance of the Pacific fleet, and the need for the Hawaiian Islands to be prepared to support it. It was also a call to action, and a reminder of the sacrifices that must be made for the defense of the nation.

Admiral Kimmel's visit to Hawaii is a significant event, and his speech today was a powerful reminder of the sacrifices that have been made for the defense of the United States. It was a call to action, and a reminder of the need for continued vigilance and commitment to the defense of the nation.

92





APPENDIX 'B'

197D

APPENDIX 'B'


COLLECTION UNIT



APPENDIX 'C'

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HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

COMMUNICATION UNIT



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